Pfizer, Inc. et al., Petitioners, v. Government of India et al. by unknown
Judicial Decisions
Supreme Court of the United States, No. 76-749
Pfizer, Inc., et al., Petitioners, v. Government of India et al.
On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
January 11, 1978
MR. JUSTICE STEWART delivered the opinion of the Court.
In this case we are asked to decide whether a foreign nation is entitled to sue
in our courts for treble damages under the antitrust laws. The respondents are
the Government of India, the Imperial Government of Iran, and the Republic
of the Philippines. They brought separate actions in federal district courts
against the petitioners, six pharmaceutical manufacturing companies. The ac-
tions were later consolidated for pretrial purposes in the United States District
Court for the District of Minnesota.' The complaints alleged that the peti-
tioners had conspired to restrain and monopolize interstate and foreign trade
in the manufacture, distribution and sale of broad spectrum antibiotics, in
violation of §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209, as amended,
15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2. Among the practices the petitioners allegedly engaged in
were price fixing, market division and fraud upon the United State Patent Of-
fice.2 India and Iran each alleged that it was a "sovereign foreign state with
'Similar actions were also brought by Spain, South Korea, West Germany, Colombia, Kuwait
and the public of Vietnam. Vietnam was a party to this case in the Court of Appeals and was nam-
ed as a respondent in the petition for certiorari. Subsequent to the filing of the petition Vietnam's
complaint was dismissed by the District Court on the ground that the United States no longer
recognized the government of Vietnam; the dismissal was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Republic of Vietnam v. Pfizer, Inc., 556 F.2d 892 (CA8). Vietnam has not participated as a party
in this Court. Some of the other suits have been settled and the rest are pending.2The antibiotic antitrust litigation originated with a proceeding brought by the Federal Trade
Commission which resulted in an order requiring petitioners Pfizer and American Cyanamid to
grant domestic applicants licenses under their patents for broad spectrum antibiotics. See Charles
Pfizer & Co. v. F.T.C. 401 F.2d 574 (CA6). Criminal antitrust proceedings against petitioners
Pfizer, American Cyanamid and Bristol-Myers were eventually dismissed. United States v. Chas.
Pfizer & Co., 367 F. Supp. 91 (SDNY); see also United States v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 426 F.2d 32
(CA2), modified, 437 F.2d 957 (CA2), aff'd by an equally divided court, 404 U.S. 548. Most of the
large number of civil suits have been settled. See West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 314 F. Supp.
71(SDNY), aff'd, 440 F.2d 1079 (CA2).
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whom the United States of America maintains diplomatic relations"; the
Philippines alleged that it was a "sovereign and independent government."
Each respondent claimed that as a purchaser of antibiotics it had been dam-
aged in its business or property by the alleged antitrust violations and sought
treble damages under § 4 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731, 15 U.S.C. § 15, on
its own behalf and on behalf of several classes of foreign purchasers of
antibiotics.3
The petitioners asserted as an affirmative defense to the complaints that the
respondents as foreign nations were not "persons" entitled to sue for treble
damages under § 4. In response to pretrial motions4 the District Court held
that the respondents were "persons" and refused to dismiss the actions.' The
trial court certified the question for appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (b). 6
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed, 550 F.2d 396 (CA8),
and adhered to its decision upon rehearing en banc.7 550 F.2d, at 400.We
granted certiorari to resolve an important and novel question in the
administration of the antitrust laws. 430 U.S. 964.
I.
As the Court of Appeals observed, this case "turns on the interpretation of
the statute." 550 F.2d, at 397. A treble-damage remedy for persons injured by
antitrust violations was first provided in § 7 of the Sherman Act, and was re-
enacted in 1914 without substantial change as § 4 of the Clayton Act.' Section
4 provides:
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything
forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of the United
States in the district in which the defendant resides or is found or has an agent,
without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the
damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
3Each respondent also sued in a parens patriae capacity; those claims were dismissed in a
separate appeal and are not at issue here. Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 522 F.2d 612, 615-620 (CA8).4Petitioners moved to dismiss the suits brought by India and Iran. The Philippines moved to
strike petitioners' affimative defense.
5The District Court relied upon an earlier decision denying a motion to dismiss a related suit
brought by the State of Kuwait, See note 1, supra, In re Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp.
315 (SDNY). An appeal was taken from that decision but was dismissed by stipulation of the par-
ties. Thus, the Court of Appeals' decision in the present case marked the first appellate considera-
tion of the issue.6A petition for mandamus had previously been denied. Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 522 F.2d 612
(CA8).7Two judges dissented, believing that Congress, in passing the Sherman and Clayton Acts, did
not intend to include foreign sovereigns within the scope of the term "person." 550 F.2d, at 400.
Three judges in the majority also joined a concurring opinion noting the absence of controlling
legislative history and urging congressional action. Id., at 399, 400.
8Section 7 of the Sherman Act was repealed in 1955 as redundant. Ch. 283, § 3, 69 Stat. 283; see
S. REP. No. 619, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1955).
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Thus, whether a foreign nation is entitled to sue for treble damages depends
upon whether it is a "person" as that word is used in § 4. There is no statutory
provision or legislative history that provides a clear answer; it seems apparent
that the question was never considered at the time the Sherman and Clayton
Acts were enacted. 9
The Court has previously noted the broad scope of the remedies provided by
the antitrust laws. "The Act is comprehensive in its terms and coverage, pro-
tecting all who are made victims of the forbidden practices by whomever they
may be perpetrated." Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal
Sugar Co., 334.U.S. 219, 236; cf. Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International
Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 138-39. And the legislative history of the Sherman
Act demonstrates that Congress used the phrase "any person" intending it to
have its naturally broad and inclusive meaning. There was no mention in the
floor debates of any more restrictive definition. Indeed, during the course of
those debates the word "person" was used interchangeably with other terms
even broader in connotation. For example, Senator Sherman said that the
treble-damage remedy was being given to "any party," and Senator Edwards,
one of the principal draftsmen of the final bill,10 said that it established "the
right of anybody to sue who chooses to sue." 21 CONG. REC. 2569, 3148.
In light of the law's expansive remedial purpose, the Court has not taken a
technical or semantic approach in determining who is a "person" entitled to
sue for treble damages. Instead, it has said that "[tihe purpose, the subject
matter, the context, the legislative history, and the executive interpretation of
the statute are aids to construction which may indicate" the proper scope of
the law. United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600, 605.
If.
The respondents in this case possess two attributes that could arguably ex-
clude them from the scope of the sweeping phrase "any person." They are
foreign, and they are sovereign nations.
A.
As to the first of these attributes, the petitioners argue that, in light of
statements made during the debates on the Sherman Act and the general pro-
9The Sherman and Clayton Acts each provide that the word "person" "shall be deemed to in-
clude corpoations and associations existing under or authorized by the laws of either the United
States, the laws of any of the Territories, the laws of any State, or the laws of any foreign coun-
try." 15 U.S.C. §§ 7, 12.
It is apparent that this definition is inclusive rather than exclusive, and does not by itself imply that
a foreign government, any more than a natural person, falls'without its bounds. Cf. Helvering v.
Morgan's Inc., 293 U.S. 121, 125 n. 1; United States v. New York Telephone Co.,__ U.S.
n. 15.
1°See Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 489 n. 10.
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tectionist and chauvinistic attitude evidenced by the same Congress in debating
contemporaneous tariff bills, it should be inferred that the Act was intended to
protect only American consumers. Yet it is clear that a foreign corporation is
entitled to sue for treble damages, since the definition of "person" contained
in the Sherman and Clayton Acts explicitly includes "corporations and
associations existing under or authorized by ... the laws of any foreign coun-
try." See note 9, supra. Moreover, the antitrust laws extend to trade "with
foreign countries" as well as among the several States of the Union. 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1, 2.11 Clearly, therefore, Congress did not intend to make the treble-
damage remedy available only to consumers in our own country. 2
In addition, the petitioners' argument confuses the ultimate purposes of the
antitrust laws with the question of who can invoke their remedies. The fact
that Congress' foremost concern in passing the antitrust laws was the protec-
tion of Americans does not mean that it intended to deny foreigners a remedy
when they are injured by antitrust violations. Treble-damage suits by
foreigners who have been victimized by antitrust violations clearly may con-
tribute to the protection of American consumers.
The Court has noted that § 4 has two purposes: to deter violators and
deprive them of "the fruits of their illegality," and "to compensate victims of
antitrust violations for their injuries." Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S.
720, 746; Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 485-86;
Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139. To
deny a foreign plaintiff injured by an antitrust violation the right to sue would
defeat these purposes. It would permit a price fixer or a monopolist to escape
full liability for his illegal actions and would deny compensation to certain of
his victims, merely because he happens to deal with foreign customers.
Moreover, an exclusion of all foreign plaintiffs, would lessen the deterrent
effect of treble damages. The conspiracy alleged by the respondents in this case
operated in American markets as well as internationally. 3 If foreign plaintiffs
were not permitted to seek a remedy for their antitrust injuries, persons doing
"The dissent seems to contend that the Sherman Act's reference to commerce with foreign na-
tions was intended only to reach conspiracies affecting goods imported into this country. Post, at
4-5. But the scope of congressional power over foreign commerce has never been so limited, and it
is established that the antitrust laws apply to exports as well. See, e.g., Timken Roller Bearing Co.
v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 599; United States v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 92 F. Supp.
947 (Mass.).
12 Moreover, in the Webb-Pomerene Act, ch. 50, 40 Stat. 516, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 61
et seq., Congress has provided a narrow and carefully limited exception for export activity that
would otherwise violate the antitrust laws. See United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Export
Assn., 393 U.S. 199. A judicial rule excluding all non-Americans as plaintiffs in treble-damage
cases would hardly be consistent with the precisely limited exception Congress has established to
the general applicability of the antitrust laws to foreign commerce.
'
3See note 2, supra.
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business both in this country and abroad might be tempted to enter into
anticompetitive conspiracies affecting American consumers in the expectation
that the illegal profits they could safely extort abroad would offset any liability
to plaintiffs at home. If, on the other hand, potential antitrust violators must
take into account the full costs of their conduct, American consumers are




The second distinguishing characteristic of these respondents is that they are
sovereign nations. The petitioners contend that the word "person" was clearly
understood by Congress when it passed the Sherman Act to exclude sovereign
governments. The word "person," however, is not a term of art with a fixed
meaning wherever it is used, nor was it in 1890 when the Sherman Act was
passed. 5 Cf. Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425. Indeed, this Court has ex-
pressly noted that use of the word "person" in the Sherman and Clayton Acts
did not create a "hard and fast rule of exclusion" of governmental bodies.
United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S., at 604-605.
On the two previous occasions that the Court has considered whether a
sovereign government is a "person" under the antitrust laws, the mechanical
rule urged by the petitioners has been rejected.16 In United States v. Cooper
Corp., supra, the United States sought to maintain a treble-damage action
under § 7 of the Sherman Act for injury to its business or property. The Court
considered the question whether the United States was a "person" entitled to
14It has been suggested that depriving foreign plaintiffs of a treble-damage remedy and thus en-
couraging illegal conspiracies would affect American consumers in other ways as well: by raising
worldwide prices and thus contributing to American inflation; by discouraging foreign entrants
who might undercut monopoly prices in this country; and by allowing violators to accumulate a
"war chest" of monopoly profits to police domestic cartels and defend them from legal attacks.
Velvel, Antitrust Suits by Foreign Nations, 25 CATH. U.L. REV. i, 7-8 (1975).
15The case relied on by petitioners as establishing a general rule, United States v. Fox, 94 U.S.
315, merely adopted New York's construction of its Statute of Wills, as a matter of state law. Id.,
at 320. Even in New York the word "person" did not have a settled meaning. Compare In re Will
of Fox, 52 N.Y. v. 530, aff'd. sub nom., United States v. Fox, 94 U.S. 315, with Republic of Hon-
duras v. Soto, 112 N.Y. 310, 19 N.E. 845. In fact, contemporaneous cases generally held that the
sovereign was entitled to have the benefit of a statute extending a right to "persons." See, e.g.,
Stanley v. Schwalby, 147 U.S. 508, 514-17; Dollar Savings Bank v. United States, 19 Wall. 227,
239; Lofton Cotton v. United States, I I How. 229, 231.
Cases construing federal statutes of the same era also indicate that the use of the term "person"
did not invariably imply an intent to exclude governmental bodies. See e.g., Ohio v. Helvering,
292 U.S. 360 ("person" in §§ 3140 and 3244 of the Revised Statutes of 1878 includes a State);
California v. United States, 320 U.S. 577, 585-586 ("person" in the Shipping Act of 1916, ch. 451,
39 Stat. 728, as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 801 et seq., includes both a State and a city); Chattanooga
Foundry & Pipe Works v. City of Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390, 396 ("person" in the Sherman Act in-
cludes a city).
16Even earlier, in Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. City of Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390, 396, the
Court held without extended discussion that a city was entitled to sue for treble damages.
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sue for treble damages as one to be decided not "by a strict construction of the
words of the Act, nor by the application of artificial canons of construction,"
but by analyzing the language of the statute "in the light, not only of the
policy intended to be served by the enactment, but, as well, by all other
available aids to construction." Id., at 605. The Court noted that the Sherman
Act provides several separate and distinct remedies: criminal prosecutions, in-
junctions and seizure of property by the United States on the one hand, and
suits for treble damages "granted to redress private injury" on the other. Id.,
at 607-08. Statements made during the congressional debates on the Sherman
dnd Clayton Acts provided further evidence that Congress affirmatively in-
tended to exclude the United States from the treble-damage remedy. Id., at
611-12. Thus, the Court found that the United States was not a "person" en-
titled to bring suit for treble damages. 7
In Georgia v. Evans, 316 U.S. 159, decided the very next Term, the question
was whether Georgia was entitled to sue for treble damages under § 7 of the
Sherman Act. The Court of Appeals, believing that the Cooper case con-
trolled, had held that a State, like the Federal Government, was not a "per-
son." This Court reversed, noting that Cooper did not hold "that the word
'person,' abstractly considered, could not include a governmental body." Id.,
at 161. As in Cooper, the Court did not rest its decision upon a bare analysis of
the word "person," but relied instead upon the entire statutory context to hold
that Georgia was entitled to sue. Unlike the United States, which "had chosen
for itself three potent weapons for enforcing the Act," ibid., a State had been
given no other remedies to enforce the prohibitions of the law. To deprive it
also of a suit for damages "would deny all redress to a State, when mulcted by
a violator of the Sherman Law, merely because it is a State." Id., at 162-63.
Although the legislative history of the Sherman Act did not indicate that Con-
gress ever considered whether a State would be entitled to sue, the Court found
no reason to believe that Congress had intended to deprive a State of the
remedy made available to all other victims of antitrust violations.
It is clear that in Georgia v. Evans the Court rejected the proposition that
the word "person" as used in the antitrust laws excludes all sovereign states.
And the reasoning of that case leads to the conclusion that a foreign nation,
like a domestic state, is entitled to pursue the remedy of treble damages when it
has been injured in its business or property by antitrust violations. When a
foreign nation enters our commercial markets as a purchaser of goods or ser-
vices, it can be victimized by anticompetitive practices just as surely as a
private person or a domestic state. The antitrust laws provide no alternate
1
7 In 1955 Congress amended the Clayton Act to allow the United States to sue for single
damages when it is injured in its business or property. ch. 283, § 1, 69 Stat. 282, 15 U.S.C. § 15A.
International Lawyer, Vol. 12, No. 2
Judicial Decisions 465
remedies for foreign nations as they do for the United States." s The words of
Georgia v. Evans are thus equally applicable here:
We can perceive no reason for believing that Congress wanted to deprive a [foreign
nation], as purchaser of commodities shipped in [international] commerce, of the
civil remedy of treble damages which is available to other purchasers who suffer
through violation of the Act.... Nothing in the Act, its history, or its policy, could
justify so restrictive a construction of the word 'person' in § 7... Such a construc-
tion would deny all redress to a [foreign nation], when mulcted by a violator of the
Sherman Law, merely because it is a [foreign nation].
316 U.S. at 162-63.
III.
The result we reach does not involve any novel concept of the jurisdiction of
the federal courts. This Court has long recognized the rule that a foreign na-
tion is generally entitled to prosecute any civil claim in the courts of the United
States upon the same basis as a domestic corporation or individual might do.
"To deny him this privilege would manifest a want of comity and friendly feel-
ing." The Sapphire, 11 Wall. 164, 167; Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313,
323 note 2; Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 408-409; see
U.S. CONST. Art. III, § 2, cl. 1.'1 To allow a foreign sovereign to sue in our
courts for treble damages to the same extent as any other person injured by an
antitrust violation is thus no more than a specific application of a long-settled
general rule. To exclude foreign nations from the protections of our antitrust
laws would, on the other hand, create a conspicuous exception to this rule, an
exception that could not be justified in the absence of clear legislative intent.
Finally, the result we reach does not require the judiciary in any way to in-
terfere in sensitive matters of foreign policy.20 It has long been established that
18While the dissent says there are "weapons in the arsenals of foreign nations" sufficient to
enable them to counter anticompetitive conduct, such as cartels or boycotts, post, at 8, such a
political remedy is hardly available to a foreign nation faced with monopolistic control of the sup-
ply of medicines needed for the health and safety of its people.
19Congress has explicitly conferred jurisdiction upon the federal courts to entertain such suits:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in con-
troversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between-
(4) a foreign state .. .as plaintiff and citizens of a State or of different States.
28 U.S.C.A. § 1332 (a) (4) (Supp. 1977).
Among the actions foreign sovereign governments were entitled to maintain at the time of the
passage of the Sherman and Clayton Acts were suits for common-law business torts, such as unfair
competition, similar in general nature to antitrust claims. See French Republic v. Saratoga Vichy
Spring Co., 191 U.S. 427 (1903); La Republique Francaise v. Schultz, 194 F. 500 (S.D.N.Y. 1899).20 1n a letter that was presented to the Court of Appeals when it reconsidered this case en banc,
the Legal Adviser of the Department of State advised "that the Department of State would not an-
ticipate any foreign policy problems if ... foreign governments [were held to be] persons within
the meaning of Clayton Act § 4." A copy of this letter is contained in the Memorandum for the
United States as amicus curiae in opposition to the petition for a writ of certiorari filed in this
Court.
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only governments recognized by the United States and at peace with us are en-
titled to access to our courts, and that it is within the exclusive power of the
Executive Branch to determine which nations are entitled to sue. Jones v.
United States, 137 U.S. 202, 212; Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304
U.S. 126, 137-38; Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, supra, at 408-412.
Nothing we decide today qualifies this established rule of complete judicial
deference to the Executive Branch.21
We hold today only that a foreign nation otherwise entitled to sue in our
courts is entitled to sue for treble damages under the antitrust laws to the same
extent as any other plaintiff. Neither the fact that the respondents are foreign
nor the fact that they are sovereign is reason to deny them the remedy of treble
damages Congress afforded to "any person" victimized by violations of the
antitrust laws.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN took no part in the consideration or decision of this
case.
MR. JUSTICE BURGER, with whom MR. JUSTICE POWELL and MR.
JUSTICE REHNQUIST join, dissenting.
The Court today holds that foreign nations are entitled to bring treble-
damage actions in American courts against American suppliers for alleged
violations of the antitrust laws; the Court reaches this extraordinary result by
holding that for purposes of § 4 of the Clayton Act, foreign sovereigns are
"persons," while conceding paradoxically that the question "was never con-
sidered at the time the Sherman and Clayton Acts were enacted." Ante, at 4.
I dissent from this undisguised exercise of legislative power since I find the
result not only plainly at odds with the language of the statute but also with its
legislative history and precedents of this Court. The resolution of the delicate
and important policy issue of giving more than 150 foreign countries the
benefits and remedies enacted to protect American consumers should be left to
the Congress and the Executive. Congressional silence over a period of almost
a century provides no license for the Court to make this sensitive political deci-
sion vastly expanding the scope of the statute Congress enacted.
21Cf. note 1, supra.
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A.
"The starting point in every case involving construction of a statute is the
lanuage itself." Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 756
(Powell J., concurring). The relevant provisions here are § 1 of the Clayton
Act in which the word "person" is defined, and § 4 in which the treble-damage
remedy is conferred on those falling within the precisely enumerated
categories. Section 1 provides, in relevant part:
• . . The word 'person' or 'persons' wherever used in this Act shall be deemed to
include corporations and associations existing under or authorized by the laws of
either the United States, the laws of any of the Territories, the laws of any State, or
the laws of any foreign country.
Section 4 then incorporates this definition by providing:
That any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of
anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of the
United States in the district in which the defendant resides or is found or has an agent,
without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the
damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
Even on the most expansive reading, these two sections provide not the
slightest indication that Congress intended to allow foreign nations to sue
Americans for treble damages under our antitrust laws. The very fact that
foreign sovereigns were not included within the definition of "person" despite
the explicit reference to corporations and associations existing under the "laws
of any foreign country" in the same definition ought to be dispositive under
established doctrine governing interpretation of statutes. I therefore see no
escape from the conclusion that the omission by Congress of foreign nations
was deliberate.
The inclusion of foreign corporations within the statutory definition in no
sense argues for a different characterization of Congress' intent. At the time of
the passage of both the Sherman and Clayton Acts, foreign sovereigns, even
when acting in their commercial capacities, were immune from suits in the
courts of this country under the doctrine of sovereign immunity. See The
Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 7 Cranch 116 (1812); Ex parte Peru, 318
U.S. 578 (1943); Mexico v. Huffman, 324 U.S. 30 (1945). Foreign copora-
tions, of course, had no such immunity. See, e.g., Shaw v. Quincy Mining
Co., 145 U.S. 444, 453 (1891), In re Hohorst, 150 U.S. 653, 662-63 (1893).
Given that "person" as used in the Clayton and Sherman Acts refers to both
antitrust plaintiffs and defendants, see United States v. Cooper, 312 U.S. 600,
606, the decision of Congress to include foreign corporations while omitting
foreign sovereigns from the definition most likely reflects this differential
susceptiblity to suit rather than any intent to benefit foreign consumers or to
enlist their help in enforcing our antitrust laws. It would be little short of
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preposterous to think that Congress in 1890 was concerned about giving such
rights to foreign nations, even though it might well decide to do so now.
Respondent's claim that this disparate treatment cannot be justified today
when foreign states effectively control many large foreign corporations and
when sovereign immunity has been limited by the Foreign Sovereign Im-
munities Act of 1976, Pub. L. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891, is not an argument ap-
propriately addressed to or considered by this Court. If revisions in the statute
are required to take into account contemporary circumstances, that task is
properly one for Congress particularly in light of the sensitive political nature
and foreign policy implications of the question.
The Court's reliance on the references to "foreign nations" in §§ 1 and 2 of
the Sherman Act and § 1 of the Clayton Act to support an argument that Con-
gress was specifically concerned with foreign commerce and foreign nations in
1890 when the disputed definition was enacted is similarly unavailing. As a
threshold matter, congressional concern with the foreign commerce of the
United States does not entail either a desire to protect foreign nations or a will-
ingness to allow them to sue Americans for treble damages in our courts. The
Webb Pomerene Act, ch. 50, 40 Stat. 516, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 61 et seq.,
passed within only a few years of the Clayton Act indicates that such a concern
may instead be served at the expense of foreign states and consumers.'
In any event, the relevant language of §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, as
subsequently incorporated in the Clayton Act, does not support respondents'
contention. The reference to "commerce . . . with foreign nations" appeared
only in the final draft of the Act as reported by the Senate Judiciary Commit-
tee, and replaced language in the numerous earlier drafts of Senator Sherman
to the following effect:
That all arrangements, contracts, agreements, trusts, or combinations between
persons, or corporations made with a view, or which tend, to prevent full and free
competition in the production, manufacture or sale of articles of domestic growth or
production, or the sale of articles imported into the United States, . . . are hereby
declared to be against public policy, unlawful and void. . . . 21 CONG. REC. 2598
(1890) (first draft) (emphasis added). 2
The focus of this language on protecting domestic consumers from anti-
competitive practices affecting the importation of goods into the United States
could not be more clear, nor could the absence of any attention to
'The Webb Pomerene Act exempts certain actions of export associations from the antitrust
laws, but the exemption applies only if the association's actions do not restrain trade or affect the
price of exported products within the United States and do not restrain the export trade of any
domestic competitor of the association. 15 U.S.C. § 62. Although the Act was subsequently
regarded as carving out an exemption from the antitrust laws, the legislative history indicates con-
siderable question at the time whether the conduct of exporters meeting the conditions specified in
the Act would have violated the antitrust laws even without the putative exemption. See H. R.
REP. No. 50, 65th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1917).2The equivalent language of subsequent drafts can be found at 21 CONG. REC. 2598-2600.
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affording comparable protection for foreign consumers of American exports.
The language substituted by the Judiciary Committee-language tracking that
appearing in the Commerce Clause-was chosen to mollify the objections of
those Senators who felt the proposed statute exceeded Congress' constitutional
power to regulate commerce, see, e.g., 21 CONG. REC. 2600, 3147 (1890)
(remarks of Sen. George); id., at 3148-49 (remarks of Sen. Reagan); cf. Apex
Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 495; Atlantic Cleaners and Dyers v.
United States, 286 U.S. 427, 434-35 (1932); that language was not intended to
work any substantive change in the focus or scope of the Act. See United
States v. Wise, 370 U.S. 405, 420 (Harlan, J., concurring). To read this
language as evidencing an intent to protect foreign nations or foreign con-
sumers simply belies its lineage.
B.
Finally, the Court's emphasis on the deterrent effects of treble-damage ac-
tions by foreign sovereigns also will not withstand critical scrutiny. We
acknowledged in Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S., at
485-86, that while treble damages do play an important role in deterring
wrongdoers, "the treble-damage provision . . . is designed primarily as a
remedy." To allow foreign sovereigns who were clearly not the intended
beneficiaries of this remedy to nevertheless invoke it reverses this priority of
purposes, and does so solely on the basis of this Court's uninformed specula-
tion about some possible beneficial consequences to American consumers of
this "maximum deterrent." Ante, at 7. In areas of far less political delicacy,
we have been unwilling to expand the scope of the right to sue under the
antitrust laws without express congressional intent to do so. See e.g., Hawaii
v. Standard Oil Company, 405 U.S. 251, 264-65. 3
For these reasons I dissent from the Court's intrusion into the legislative
sphere.
MR. JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting.
I join THE CHIEF JUSTICE in his dissent, and add a word to emphasize my
difficulty with the Court's decision.
The issue is whether the antitrust laws of this country are to be made
3The Court adverts to a letter from the Legal Advisor of the State Department to the Court of
Appeals advising that no foreign policy problems were anticipated from a decision holding foreign
governments to be persons within the meaning of § 4 of the Clayton Act. The significance of this
communication escapes me. Nothing in the Constitution suggests legislative power may be exer-
cised jointly by the courts and the Department of State.
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available for treble-damage suits against American businesses by the govern-
ments of other countries. The Court resolves this issue in favor of such govern-
ments by construing the word "persons" in § 4 of the Clayton Act to include
"foreign governments." No one argues seriously that this was the intent of
Congress in 1890 when the term "persons" was included in the Act. Indeed,
the Court acknowledges that this "question was never considered at the time
the Sherman and Clayton Acts were enacted." Ante, at 4.
Despite this conlcusi6n as to the absence of any congressional consideration,
the inviting possibility of treble damages today is extended by judicial action to
the sovereign nations of the world.' With minor exceptions, the United States
recognizes the governments of all of these nations. We may assume that most
of them have no equivalent of our antitrust laws and would be unlikely to af-
ford reciprocal opportunities to the United States to sue and recover damages
in their courts.
The Court has resolved a major policy question. As the Solicitor General
stated in his Memorandum for the United States as amicus curiae, filed March
23, 1977:
Whether foreign sovereigns are 'persons' entitled to sue under § 4 depends largely
upon the general policy reflected in the statute, and the general policy of the United
States opening its courts to foreign sovereigns.
I had thought it was accepted doctrine that questions of "general
policy" -especially with respect to foreign sovereigns and absent explicit
legislative authority-are beyond the province of the Judicial Branch. If the
statute truly reflected a general policy that dictated the inclusion of foreign
sovereigns, the Court might be justified in reaching today's result. In Georgia
v. Evans, 316 U.S. 159 (1942), a clear policy to protect the States of the Union
was reflected in the antitrust laws and in the legislative history. The Court
could "perceive no reason for believing that Congress wanted to deprive a
State, as puchaser of commodities shipped in interstate commerce, of the civil
remedy of treble damages which is available to other purchasers who suffer
through violation of the Act." 316 U.S., at 162.
Unlike the majority, I do not believe the same can be said with respect to
foreign sovereigns. See ante, at 9-10. It is not only the absence of specific con-
gressional intent to include them. It is that the predicate for the Court's ap-
proach in Georgia v. Evans is not present in the case before us. The solicitude
that we assume Congress has for the welfare of each of the United States,
especially when the subject matter of legislation largely has been removed
from the competence of the States and has been entrusted to the United States,
'At present there are 162 sovereign nations in the world.
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cannot be assumed with respect to foreign nations. Putting it differently, it
was not illogical for the Evans Court to include the States within the reach of
§ 4, but it is a quantum leap to include foreign governments.
A court, without the benefit of legislative hearings that would illuminate the
policy considerations if the question were left to Congress, is not competent in
my opinion to resolve this question in the best interest of our country. It is
regrettable that the Court today finds it necessary to rush to this essentially
legislative judgment.2
2The Court quotes a letter to the effect that "the Department of State would not anticipate any
foreign policy problems" if § 4 were held to embrace suits by foreign governments. Ante, at I I
note 20 (emphasis supplied). But resolution of the issue here depends not only upon foreign policy
considerations but also upon considerations relevant to the general welfare of the United States.
The latter are quite beyond the concern of the Department of State and should be considered by
the Legislative Branch. The international business conducted by American corporations has
economic and social ramifications of great importance to our country.
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